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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff has no objection to any statement of fact 
presented by Highland City in its Statement of Relevant Facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Highland City's argument that it is immune from suit 
because the Plaintiff's action purportedly arises out of the 
approval of the plat map is without merit. The Plaintiff's injuries 
arose out of Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection. 
While Highland City was also negligent in failing to catch its own 
negligence before approving the plat and in failing to inspect the 
Intersection, the efficient force which caused Plaintiff fs injuries 
was Highland City's defective design of the Intersection. To hold 
otherwise would allow Highland City to absolve itself of liability 
through issuance of a self-serving permit or approval. 
Loveland v. Orem Citv. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), does not 
apply to the present case because in Loveland, the Court held that 
a municipality is immune from suit against allegations that it 
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. There is nothing 
in Loveland which can be construed as granting immunity from 
allegations that the municipality was the negligent party. Highland 
City is asking this Court to carve out an area where it should be 
allowed the freedom to act negligently without accountability. 
However, the Utah Legislature has already mandated that 
municipalities do not have immunity against allegations that they 
negligently designed, constructed or maintained streets and roads. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) ; see also Biaelow v. Incrersoll, 618 
P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); 
Carroll v. State Road Comm.. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). 
Bennett v. Bow Valley Development, 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1990), also stands for the proposition that a municipality cannot 
be held liable for failing to catch the negligence of a developer. 
However, it is inappropriate for Highland City to extrapolate this 
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principle to shield itself from its own negligence. 
Highland City's final argument is that it cannot be held 
liable because the developer should have informed Highland City of 
the poorly designed Intersection. This argument, made for the first 
time on appeal, is completely unsupported by any case law or 
statutory authority. It is nothing more than a conclusory statement 
made in a last ditch effort to avoid liability. However, assuming 
Highland City is correct in this statement of law, it creates 
genuine issues of material fact which must be decided by the trier 
or fact. The trier of fact must determine whether or not industry 
standards require the developer to inform the municipality of the 
entity's poor design. The trier of fact must also rule on whether 
the developer in this case did, in fact, inform Highland City of 
the defective design of the Intersection. 
Even if the developer negligently failed to point out 
Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection, the law of 
intervening cause holds that this failure would not relieve 
Highland City of liability if the developer's failure was 
foreseeable. Godesky v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The 
trier of fact must determine whether or not the developer's 
intervening negligence was foreseeable. If so, Highland City is 
still liable for its negligent design of the Intersection. 
Highland City has waived immunity for the allegations in 
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Plaintiff's Complaint. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
OVERVIEW 
In her original memorandum, Plaintiff challenged Highland 
City to respond to one simple question: Why would the Legislature 
allow municipalities the freedom to negligently design roads in 
private subdivisions which provide access to public roads when it 
would not allow municipalities to negligently design public roads 
without accountability? Biaelow v. Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State 
Road C O M . . 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). 
Highland City never addressed this challenge. Highland 
City never argues that such a distinction should be made between 
private roads negligently designed by the municipality and public 
roads negligently designed by the municipality. Yet this is the key 
issue in this case, for to grant immunity to Highland City for its 
actions in this case is to carve out an area where municipalities 
are free to act negligently without accountability. Plaintiff 
respectfully contends that Highland City has presented no arguments 
which suggest that the Legislature intended to allow municipalities 
a "freebie11, an area where it cannot be held accountable for its 
negligence. Instead, all of the case law and all of the statutory 
authority lead to the opposite conclusion. A Municipality should be 
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held liable whether the road it negligently designs is a public or 
a private road. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989). 
Also absent from Highland City's brief is any denial that 
it indeed designed the Intersection. It appears that the parties 
are in agreement that Highland City negligently designed the 
Intersection, as testified to by the developer, Paul Frampton, and 
Richard Clayton. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13); 
R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 14-15). Thus, the 
central issue in this appeal is not whether Highland City was 
negligent in designing the Intersection. The parties agree on that 
fact. The issue is whether or not the Utah Legislature has granted 
Highland City the freedom to negligently design roads in private 
subdivisions which provide access to public roads. 
POINT I 
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR ITS 
NEGLIGENT DESIGN OF THE INTERSECTION 
Highland City's first argument is that its actions are 
protected by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) (1989) because it 
merely approved the plat. But as demonstrated at length in 
Plaintiff's opening brief, this section is irrelevant because the 
cause of action did not "arise out of" Highland City's approval of 
the plat. Instead, this cause of action arose out of Highland 
City's negligent design of the Intersection. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 32-29) . Highland City is still trying to "torture the facts" of 
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this case in order to pigeonhole this action into a category for 
which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 P.2d 126 
(Utah 1987) . The Utah Supreme Court has already held that such 
arguments are improper. Id. 
Here, there can be no doubt that the cause of action 
arose out of Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection. 
Highland City is correct that it was also negligent in approving 
the plat containing the Intersection the city negligently designed. 
But the actual and proximate cause of the injury to the Plaintiff 
was Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection. 
To hold otherwise would allow Highland City to absolve 
its own negligence by issuance of a self-serving approval. The law 
of governmental immunity could plummet to the point where every 
governmental entity issues a statement at the end of each road 
project indicating that indeed it was negligent in many aspects, 
and that the legislature had concededly waived immunity for those 
negligent acts, but nevertheless the governmental body can not be 
held liable because the entity has reviewed its own actions, 
decided that it does not want to be held liable, and has issued a 
permit or approval forever absolving its employees of liability and 
precluding actions by private citizens injured by that negligence. 
To any subsequent act for negligence in the design and construction 
of the road, the governmental entity would simply argue that it had 
6 
approved the negligent acts and, therefore, immunity is retained. 
This despite the Utah Legislature's expressed intent to 
hold governmental entities liable for their actions with respect to 
roads and streets. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989). Highland City's 
end run around the statute should fail. The Utah Legislature's 
express intent to hold governmental entities liable for their 
negligent construction of roads should prevail. 
Now we turn to Loveland v. Orem City. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 
1987) . Highland City argues that in Loveland. the Utah Supreme 
Court held that municipalities cannot be held liable for negligence 
related to private developments. The Intersection was a private 
development. Therefore, Highland City cannot be held liable. 
However, Highland City fails to capture the key 
distinction between Loveland and the present case. For clarity, 
Plaintiff will present the Lovelands' exact argument: 
The Lovelands urge that this case comes within 
the waivers of immunity for several reasons. 
They claim that North Unions's canal comes 
within the definition of a culvert and argue 
that the minutes of the City Council meetings 
indicate that the City was aware of the canal 
that ran through the Executive Estates 
subdivision and the potential danger it 
presented to that subdivision's residents. 
Additionally, they claim that the Executive 
Estates subdivision is a "public improvement" 
which, without adequate implementation of a 
directive to fence the canal, created a 
dangerous condition which resulted in their 
son's death. 
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Loveland, 746 P.2d at 776. Thus, the essence of the Lovelands1 
argument was that Orem City failed to regulate or monitor the 
developer to make sure he protected residents of the subdivision 
from the culvert by fencing the canal. In other words, Orem City 
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. In the instant 
case, Highland City was the negligent party because it designed the 
Intersection, and thereby accepted the duty to do the job properly. 
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The only 
negligence Highland City failed to catch was its own. 
Thus, there is no support in Loveland for Highland City's 
position that it is immune from its own negligence. Loveland stands 
for the principle that a municipality is immune from allegations 
that it failed to catch the negligence of a developer. Highland 
City twists that principle into an unrecognizable position, arguing 
that because it does not have to catch the negligence of a 
subdivision developer, that gives it free reign to negligently 
design the subdivision itself and it is immune from suit for its 
own negligence. 
Deeply submersed in Highland City's argument is its true 
contention with regard to Loveland. Highland City is arguing that 
it should have the freedom to imperil citizens through its 
negligence and should be allowed to absolve itself of liability. 
However, Highland City has not provided any public policy support 
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for that contention. Highland City also lacks statutes or case law 
supporting its position. 
On the other hand, Plaintiff has provided several policy 
arguments as to why this should be avoided, not the least of which 
isf a municipality should not be immune from suit for imperilling 
residents living in private developments when the Utah Legislature 
has already stripped the same entity of immunity for imperilling 
those using public roads. These policy arguments have their 
foundation is both statute and case law, for the Utah Legislature 
and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently held that governmental 
entities should be held liable for the negligent design of streets 
and roads. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) ; Biaelow v. Incrersoll, 
618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
1975); Carroll v. State Road Comm.. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if Highland City is 
to be granted the freedom to act negligently, this should be based 
on sound public policy rather than a few sentences taken out of 
context from an easily distinguishable case. The fact that Highland 
City has not marshalled one policy argument lending credence to its 
position is good evidence that the Legislature never intended to 
grant municipalities immunity when they negligent design 
subdivisions. 
Highland City also relies on Bennett v. Bow Valley 
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Development, 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990). In Bennett. the plaintiff 
alleged that Bow Valley was negligent in "filling natural drainage 
channels, failing to comply with grading plans, failing to 
construct roads in a safe manner and with proper compaction, and 
failing to revegetate cut slopes." Id. at 421. The allegations 
against Provo City were that it "released improvement bonds 
furnished by Bow Valley without requiring it to make the necessary 
improvements in the subdivision and that this constituted negligent 
release of the bonds." Id. 
To compare Bennett to this case is to compare apples and 
oranges. The sole allegation against the municipality was that it 
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. There was no 
contention that Provo City filled the drainage channels or 
negligently constructed the road. The developer did these things. 
The City simply failed to make sure that each task was done right. 
The developer was the negligent party. In the instant case, 
Highland City, not the developer, was the negligent party. Once 
again, the mere fact that the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
municipalities are immune from allegations that they failed to 
catch the negligence of others cannot be translated into immunity 
for the municipality's own negligent design of a road. 
Highland City asks this Court to focus on two words in 
the Bennett decision—"receipt and analysis". (Highland City's 
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Brief, p. 11) . From these two words, Highland City argues that the 
Utah Supreme Court has expressly authorized it to negligently 
design subdivisions. From these two words, Highland City contends 
that the Legislature must have meant that municipalities could 
negligently design roads even though the Legislature already 
mandated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1992) that they could not 
negligently design public roads. 
However, there is no support in the Bennett case for this 
proposition. There is no language in that opinion which could be 
remotely construed to mean that the Legislature intended to allow 
municipalities an area where they were free to act negligently. All 
the Court held was that if the developer was the designer and the 
negligent party, then the plaintiff can't bring suit against the 
municipality. There is no language which precludes suit against the 
municipality if that is the entity that was negligent in designing 
or constructing the road. 
In a last ditch effort to avoid liability for its own 
negligence, Highland City argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that the developer was truly the negligent party. Highland City 
argues that the developer was negligent in that it should have 
informed Highland City of the City's negligence and requested that 
the Intersection be relocated to a safer location. 
There are two problems with this argument. First, there 
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is absolutely no support for the proposition that a developer must 
inform the municipality of the municipality's negligence. Highland 
City not only fails to provide any legal support for its 
proposition, but it also fails to provide any expert opinion 
evidence suggesting that industry standards require the developer 
to "cure" the negligence of the municipality. Highland City could 
no doubt argue that such a contention has merit. However, Plaintiff 
could just as easily argue that the developer should be allowed to 
assume that when the municipality changes a plat, it has properly 
engineered the plat to insure that it is safe. Because this 
argument was raised for the first time on appeal, the parties are 
unprepared to present evidence to this Court on this proposition. 
Instead, Highland City creates genuine issues of material 
fact warranting reversal of the summary judgment. The trier of 
fact, after hearing all relevant expert testimony and other 
evidence, is the proper entity to determine whether or not industry 
standards require the developer to inform the municipality of the 
City's negligent act. The trier of fact is the proper entity to 
determine whether or not the developer informed Highland City of 
its negligence in this case. Additionally, even if the developer 
was negligent, the trier of fact must apportion fault between the 
negligent municipality, Highland City, and the negligent developer. 
Because summary judgment was granted before trial, the 
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jury never resolved these issues, which are critical to Highland 
City's theory that the developer negligently failed to cure 
Highland City's negligence. This cause of action should be remanded 
so that the trier of fact can resolve these key factual issues. 
The second problem with Highland City's argument is that 
it assumes that because the developer negligently failed to inform 
the municipality of the municipality's negligence, the municipality 
is freed from fault. In other words, Highland City is arguing that 
the developer's negligence was an intervening cause which absolves 
Highland City of liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held with respect to 
"intervening causes" that: 
An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superseding force that 
relieves the original actor of liability. The 
earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable 
negligent acts of others. Therefore, if the 
intervening negligence is foreseeable, the 
earlier negligent act is a concurring cause. 
Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). Also, in 
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] person's negligence is not 
superseded by the negligence of another if the subsequent 
negligence of another is foreseeable." Id. at 219. 
By arguing that the developer was an intervening 
negligent force, Highland City creates additional genuine issues of 
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material facte A trier of fact must decide whether or not the 
failure of the developer to catch Highland City's negligence was a 
foreseeable act. If so, then Highland City's negligence is not 
absolved by the developer's subsequent negligence. 
Thus, Highland City's argument that it cannot be held 
liable is contingent upon several genuine issues of material fact 
which have never been addressed to any trier of fact. It is 
improper for Highland City to make its bald statements of non-
liability before this Court. Highland City must prove these issues 
to the trier of fact. 
Highland City has never denied that it in fact 
negligently designed the Intersection. Highland City has also 
presented no evidence, legal support, or policy support which would 
suggest that it should be immune from its negligence. 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully 
asserts that Highland City should not be immune from suit against 
allegations that it negligently designed the Intersection because 
it would not be immune from suit if the Intersection was a public 
road. As such, the trial court's entry of summary judgment should 
be reversed, and the case remanded. 
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POINT II-IV 
PLAINTIFF CONCEDE8 THAT HIGHLAND CITY CANNOT 
BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILING TO MAINTAIN OR SIGN 
11500 NORTH. 
In Points II through IV, Highland City argues that it had 
no duty to maintain and sign the Intersection. Plaintiff did not 
present these issues in the Statement of Issues presented in her 
opening brief. The reason is that after the motion for summary 
judgment was granted and the docketing statement was filed 
identifying the issues, this Court held, in Jones v. Bountiful 
City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), that a municipality has no 
duty to sign public roads. However, once the municipality decided 
to sign a road, it had a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner. 
Id. at 560. Applying this principle here, it appears Plaintiff has 
no claim against Highland City for failure to maintain or sign the 
road since it was Utah County which accepted the duty to sign the 
road. 
POINT V 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-10(1)(d) (1989) 
RELATING TO NEGLIGENT INSPECTION BY A 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS 
CASE BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE 
OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT INSPECTION, 
Highland City also argues that its true failing in this 
case was not the negligent design of the Intersection, or even the 
negligent approval of the plat map. Instead, Highland City now 
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argues that its truly negligent act was that it failed to "inspect" 
the Intersection. 
As with Highland City's contention that it was negligent 
in "approving" the platf this argument must fail because the cause 
of action did not "arise out of" the negligent inspection. Instead, 
the cause of action arose out of Highland City's negligent design 
of the Intersection. Without undue repetition, Highland City 
should not be allowed to "torture the facts" of this case into a 
category for which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 
733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). The efficient force that injured the 
Plaintiff was not Highland City's subsequent failure to discover 
its own negligence through inspections prior to issuance of the 
permit. Instead, the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries was Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that Highland City is not 
immune from suit for the negligent design of the Intersection. As 
such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this matter be remanded 
to the trial court for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this 31 day of March, 1993. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
o 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Attorney for Plaintif 
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